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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-2451 
_____________ 
 
CASSANDRA GROGAN, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 10-cv-3162) 
District Judge:  Hon. John R. Padova 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 13, 2012 
 
Before:   McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 23, 2012) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Cassandra Grogan appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania affirming the decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(“ALJ”) to deny Grogan’s claims for disability insurance benefits and supplemental 
security income.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
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I. Background 
A. Facts 
1. Relevant Vocational and Functional Background 
Grogan is a forty-one year old female who was thirty-six at the time she alleged 
disability in this case.  From 1998 to April 2001, Grogan worked as a Certified Nurse’s 
Assistant, and, in 2006, an ALJ granted her disability status for a closed period beginning 
April 30, 2001 and ending August 1, 2005.1
2. Physical Health Treatment 
  After her disability period ended, Grogan 
worked for a debt collection bureau, making phone calls and doing data entry until 
October 2006, when she stopped working because of her alleged current disability.  Her 
impairments involve pain, back abnormalities, IBS, anxiety, depression, bipolar disorder, 
and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).   
Grogan’s medical records include a history of back and gastrointestinal (“GI”) 
problems.2
                                              
1 Grogan’s prior claims stemmed from degenerative disc disease, irritable bowel 
syndrome (“IBS”), and depressive disorder.   
2 Grogan’s treatment records for her IBS are limited.  In March 2004, Grogan saw 
a gastroenterologist, Dr. Mark Tanker.  Tanker observed that Grogan had been diagnosed 
with IBS in the past but had had no GI evaluation for six or seven years. Tanker 
prescribed Bentyl and Zantac and recommended that Grogan increase her fiber intake.  
During the period at issue, Grogan made numerous GI complaints to her treating 
physicians.  She also visited Dr. Alexander Harmatz, a GI specialist, on or prior to 
October 30, 2007.  Although both Tanker and Harmatz ordered laboratory tests, the 
results of those tests are not in the record. 
  Several magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) scans show that Grogan suffers 
from a back abnormality.  In June 2005, Grogan’s pain management specialist, Dr. 
Thomas Zavitsanos, prescribed a series of steroid injections to alleviate pain Grogan 
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complained of having in her back.  Grogan reported significant, but not complete, pain 
reduction.  She did not return to see Zavitsanos until July 2007.   
In the interim, she was attended by her primary care physician, Dr. Gerald 
Skobinsky.  Skobinsky’s care from March 2006 to July 2007 involved general treatment 
for earaches and cold symptoms, as well as prescriptions for pain and GI medications.  
Upon Grogan’s return visit to Zavitsanos on July 23, 2007, Zavitsanos reported no 
changes and again recommended a series of steroid injections.  Grogan acknowledged 
“definite but transient improvement” in pain after receiving her first injection (App. 2 at 
322),3
3. Mental Health Treatment 
 and “60% to 70% pain relief for 6 to 8 weeks” after her second injection,  (App. 2 
at 399).  
In March 2008, Zavitsanos reported no change in reflexes but noted a diminished 
capacity for physical sensation.  He recommended that Grogan consult a neurosurgeon, 
which she had failed to do upon his earlier suggestion because she had “a lot of things 
going on” and was dealing with household issues.  (App. 2 at 399.)  An MRI in April 
2008 showed no changes from prior tests.   
On June 25, 2007, Grogan underwent an evaluation with her treating psychiatrist, 
Dr. Polina Stolyarova, who diagnosed Grogan with major depression and PTSD.  
Stolyarova gave Grogan a global assessment of functioning (“GAF”) score of 60, 
indicating moderate difficulty functioning.  Stolyarova’s treatment notes indicate 
continued depression and anger issues, but also indicate appropriate appearance, 
                                              
3 “App. 2” refers to appendix volume 2 of the record. 
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cooperative behavior, intact thought processes, and no suicidal plans or ideations.  
Stolyarova also noted improvement during this period.   
On May 13, 2008, Grogan underwent a second yearly evaluation with Stolyarova, 
who diagnosed Grogan with bipolar disorder but noted that Grogan was responding well 
to medication.  Stolyarova assigned Grogan a GAF score of 62, indicating more mild 
symptoms.   
On October 2, 2008, Grogan was involuntarily committed to a hospital for 
approximately one week after she took an overdose of her medication in a reported 
suicide attempt.  Upon hospital intake, Grogan was assigned a GAF score of 20, 
indicating some danger of hurting herself.   
Grogan returned to treatment in January 2009 with a new psychiatrist Dr. E. 
Karzova,  who reported that, although Grogan was depressed, she was attentive and did 
not exhibit any suicidal plans or ideations.  Grogan declared that she felt a 60 percent 
improvement with medication.  Karzova recommended continued psychotherapy and 
assigned Grogan a GAF score of 65, indicating improvement.  In February 2009, Grogan 
reported “feeling a little better,” and Karzova noted a “slight improvement.”  (Tr. at 
448.)4
4. Opinion Evidence 
 
Several medical opinions regarding Grogan’s ability to function were submitted in 
connection with her application for benefits.  First, Skobinsky submitted a medical source 
statement in which he checked boxes indicating that Grogan could occasionally carry two 
                                              
4 “Tr.” refers to the transcript of administrative proceedings in this case.  
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to three pounds, stand or walk for no more than one hour per eight-hour workday, and sit 
for no more than one hour per eight-hour workday.   
Grogan also submitted a letter dated March 20, 2007 from Stolyarova stating that 
Grogan was “not capable of completing complicated forms and require[d] assistance with 
complex tasks.”  (App. 2 at 199.)  Stolyarova also completed a source statement on 
January 31, 2008, reporting that Grogan’s impairment affected her ability to understand, 
remember, and carry out instructions, and her ability to respond to supervision, co-
workers, and work pressures.  Stolyarova concluded that Grogan suffered from “an 
unstable mental condition,” “poor anger management, increased anxiety[,] and unstable 
mood.”  (App. 2 at 364.)   
 In December 2007, Dr. Paul Taren, a state agency psychologist, reviewed 
Grogan’s medical records and concluded that she suffered from major depressive 
disorder and PTSD.  Taren found that Grogan had moderate limitations in the ability to 
understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions, maintain concentration, 
persistence, or pace, and respond appropriately to changes in work settings.   
 Dr. Gerald Gryczko, a state agency physician who reviewed Grogan’s medical 
records, concluded that Grogan suffered from a back abnormality and IBS, but found that 
she could lift or carry ten to twenty pounds and stand or walk about six hours in an eight-
hour workday.   
B. Procedural History 
On August 29, 2007 and September 4, 2007, respectively, Grogan filed a Title II 
application for disability insurance benefits and a Title XVI application for supplemental 
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security income, alleging disability beginning October 15, 2006.  Those claims were 
denied, and, upon Grogan’s request, a hearing was held before an ALJ on May 12, 2009, 
at which Grogan and a vocational expert testified.   
Grogan testified that, because of her back impairment, she needs assistance with, 
or cannot do, several household activities.  However, she reported that she could make 
coffee, prepare simple meals, do light cleaning, pay bills, and feed her pet cat.  
Additionally, she testified that her IBS affects her every day, and she only eats once a day 
after she “gets [her] bowels in control.”  (App. 2 at 45.) 
The vocational expert testified that a person of the same age, education, and past 
work history as Grogan, who was capable of performing sedentary work that affords the 
opportunity to sit or stand and is routine and simple, could not perform Grogan’s past 
work. The expert went on to say, however, that jobs exist in the national economy, 
including clerical positions and sedentary, unskilled work for packers and assemblers, 
that such a person could perform.   
On May 29, 2009, The ALJ ruled that Grogan was not disabled.  The ALJ 
determined that Grogan suffered from severe impairments but that none of them required 
an automatic determination of disability, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).  The ALJ next 
concluded that Grogan could not return to her past work but that she had the residual 
functional capacity5
                                              
5 “Residual functional capacity” is “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [her] 
limitations.”  20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). 
 to perform sedentary work that affords the opportunity to sit or 
stand, involves no detailed instructions, and requires few work changes.   
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In determining that Grogan could perform sedentary work, the ALJ attributed 
“little weight” to the highly restrictive opinions of Skobinsky.  (App. 2 at 19.)  The ALJ 
reasoned that Skobinsky’s assessment was 
not supported by the doctor’s own records or by the records of other 
treating physicians such as Dr. Zavitsanos who saw the claimant from 2003 
to 2008.  Such records … do not relate motor power or reflex deficits, 
persistent positive straight leg raising, significantly limited spinal or 
extremity range of motion, significant gait dysfunction other than on 
examination that was suspect for exaggerated pain behavior … . 
 
(Id.)  The ALJ also gave “little weight” to Stolyarova’s mental health assessment, 
reasoning that the record “shows [Grogan had] mental health symptoms but overall does 
not indicate symptoms of a level commensurate with [Stolyarova’s assessment].”  (App. 
2 at 20.)   
On April 22, 2010, the Appeals Council denied Grogan’s request for review, 
making the ALJ’s decision final.  Grogan then filed a complaint in District Court, 
alleging that the denial of her claims was not supported by substantial evidence.  On 
February 23, 2011, Magistrate Judge Hart issued a Report and Recommendation 
suggesting that Grogan’s request for review be denied, and, on April 2, 2011, the District 
Court entered an order denying Grogan’s request for review and granting summary 
judgment for the Commissioner.  This timely appeal followed.  
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II. Discussion6
Grogan argues that the District Court erred in upholding the ALJ’s decision to 
give limited weight to Grogan’s treating physicians’ opinions in the course of deciding 
that Grogan was capable of sedentary work.  She argues that had those opinions been 
appropriately credited, they would have supported a decision in her favor.  We disagree 
and conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. 
 
A. Applicable Law 
To prove disability, a claimant must demonstrate that she suffers from some 
“medically determinable physical or mental impairment” that prevents her from 
“engage[ing] in any substantial gainful activity” for a period of at least twelve months.  
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 315-16 (3d Cir. 2000).  A 
claimant will be considered disabled and receive benefits only if 
the claimant demonstrates that (1) [s]he is not currently engaged in any 
substantial gainful activity; (2) [s]he is severely impaired; and either (3) 
[her] impairment is listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1, in which 
case [s]he is presumptively disabled, or (4) [her] impairment prevents [her] 
from meeting the physical and mental demands of the kind of job that [s]he 
                                              
6 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s order for 
summary judgment is plenary; however, “our review of the ALJ’s decision is more 
deferential as we determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the decision 
of the Commissioner.” Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000).  Substantial 
evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 
to support a conclusion.”  Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  “Despite the deference to administrative decisions 
implied by [the substantial evidence] standard, appellate courts retain a responsibility to 
scrutinize the entire record and to reverse or remand if the [Commissioner’s] decision is 
not supported by substantial evidence.”  Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 971 (3d Cir. 
1981) (citations omitted).   
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has held in the past, and (5) [her] impairment together with [her] age, 
education, and past work experience also prevents [her] from doing any 
other sort of work.   
 
Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520).  “A 
cardinal principle guiding disability eligibility determinations is that the ALJ accord 
treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect expert 
judgment based on a continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a prolonged 
period of time.’”  Morales, 225 F.3d at 317 (quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 
(3d Cir. 1999).  However, “[t]he law is clear … that the opinion of a treating physician 
does not bind the ALJ on the issue of functional capacity.”  Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 
193, 197 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011).  A treating physician’s opinion on the nature and severity of 
a claimant’s impairment is only given controlling weight when it is “‘well-supported by 
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent 
with the other substantial evidence in the [claimant’s] case record.’”  Fargnoli v. 
Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43 (3d Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 
404.1527(d)(2)). 
When a treating physician’s opinion “conflicts with that of a non-treating, non-
examining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit but ‘cannot reject evidence for 
no reason or for the wrong reason.’”  Morales, 225 F.3d at 317 (quoting Plummer, 186 
F.3d at 429)); see Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 43 (when an ALJ “weigh[s] the credibility of the 
evidence, he must give some indication of the evidence that he rejects and his reason(s) 
for discounting that evidence.”).   
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B. Treating Physician’s Opinion  
1. Back Impairment 
As to her back impairment, Grogan argues that the ALJ improperly rejected  
Dr. Skobinsky’s conclusion that she could lift or carry only two to three pounds, 
cumulatively stand or walk for no more than one hour per eight-hour workday, and sit for 
no more than one hour per eight-hour workday.  That report, if taken at face value, would 
be work-preclusive.  The ALJ concluded, however, that Grogan’s back impairment is not 
so severe as to entirely preclude her from engaging in any gainful activity, and that 
Skobinsky’s opinion was “not supported by the doctor’s own records or by the records of 
other treating physicians.” (App. 2 at 19.)  We agree with the District Court that the 
ALJ’s determination was supported by substantial evidence.   
First, Skobinsky’s treatment records for Grogan indicate general care for cold 
symptoms and administering prescriptions.  The ALJ reasonably concluded that those 
records do not support Skobinsky’s highly restrictive opinion, as they do not correlate to 
any impairment affecting Grogan’s motor power, reflexes, positive straight leg raising, 
significant limitations on range of motion, or gait dysfunction – all of which are relevant 
to her ability to perform sedentary work.  Moreover, although we have stated that an ALJ 
“may not make speculative inferences from medical reports and may reject a treating 
physician’s opinion outright only on the basis of contradictory medical evidence,” 
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Morales, 225 F.3d at 317 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), the record 
does contain medical evidence contrary to Skobinsky’s opinion.7
Skobinsky’s opinion also conflicts with that of Dr. Gryczko, the state agency 
physician who concluded that Grogan was capable of limited work including lifting or 
carrying twenty to twenty-five pounds and standing or walking about six hours in an 
eight-hour workday.  Skobinsky’s opinion also is contrary to the evidence of Grogan’s 
abilities and lifestyle.  The ALJ observed that, by Grogan’s own account, she was able to 
perform numerous activities such as making simple meals, caring for her children, paying 
bills, and light cleaning.  The ALJ also noted that most medical evaluators reported that 
Grogan maintained proper self-care and grooming.  Grogan’s ability to perform so many 
 
Indeed, Skobinsky’s opinion is inconsistent with the notes from Dr. Zavitsanos’s 
treatment of Grogan, which indicate that Grogan’s pain had, at least temporarily, been 
aided by steroid injections.  Zavitsanos also reported that Grogan’s sensorimotor abilities 
and reflexes remained unchanged, though she had diminished capacity for physical 
sensation.  Those findings undermine Skobinsky’s opinion that Grogan was essentially 
unable to work.  In addition, Zavitsanos’s reports of no changes in motor or deep tendon 
reflexes further support the ALJ’s conclusion that the medical records “do not relate [to] 
motor power or reflex deficits.”  (App. 2 at 19.) 
                                              
7 It is also noteworthy that the forms that Skobinsky filled out consisted largely of 
simply checking boxes.  We have previously found the credibility of this type of opinion 
evidence to be suspect.  See Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1065 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“Form reports in which a physician’s obligation is only to check a box or fill in a blank 
are weak evidence at best.”).  Additionally, Skobinsky’s notations and explanations for 
his entries consist largely of merely “see above” and “included.”  (See App. 2 at 366-67.) 
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daily functions involving reasonable motor function supports the ALJ’s conclusion that 
Grogan was capable of sedentary work.8
2. Gastrointestinal Impairment 
  Thus, we conclude that substantial evidence 
supports the ALJ’s decision to give diminished weight to Skobinsky’s opinion. 
Grogan also contends that the ALJ failed to give proper consideration to her GI 
symptoms.  She is correct that her complaints of persistent diarrhea are well-supported in 
the record.  However, the ALJ’s conclusion that Grogan’s IBS was largely under control 
is nonetheless supported by substantial evidence. 
Grogan saw a gastroenterologist, Dr. Tanker, who prescribed medication and 
recommended that she increase her fiber intake in March 2004, and she saw another 
gastroenterologist, Dr. Harmatz, on one occasion in 2007.9
                                              
8 Also, despite Grogan’s continuing complaints of severe pain, she testified at her 
hearing that she was not receiving any treatment for her back other than pain medication 
at the time.  Additionally, despite her alleged pain profile, Grogan “ke[pt] forgetting to 
find a pain specialist.”  (App. 2 at 384.)  The ALJ reasonably noted that “if [Grogan’s] 
back pain was of the level testified to at hearing by [Grogan], it does not seem reasonable 
that she would have gone over a year without obtaining a new pain management 
specialist.”  (App. 2 at 18.)   
9 Although both specialists ordered laboratory tests done, the results of those tests 
do not appear in the record.   
  Grogan made numerous 
reports to her treating physicians and in her testimony about intestinal problems, but  
there is no evidence in the medical record that her condition was not helped by her 
medications or that it was so severe as to preclude her from working.  The severity of 
Grogan’s IBS is shown only through her own testimony and complaints.  A state 
physician reviewed the records with respect to Grogan’s IBS and determined that her 
condition was not so severe as to be work-preclusive. 
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In light of the foregoing, we are satisfied that substantial evidence supports the 
ALJ’s conclusion that Grogan’s IBS did not prevent her from being able to work. 
C. Treating Psychiatrist’s Opinion 
 Grogan argues that substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s decision to give 
diminished weight to the opinion of Dr. Stolyarvoa, Grogan’s treating psychiatrist.  
Stolyarova’s opinion evidence consisted of a letter and source statement indicating 
moderate, severe, and extreme limitations in Grogan’s mental capacity.  Based on the 
record, the ALJ’s decision to give diminished weight to Stolyarova’s restrictive opinion 
is supportable. 
 First, Stolyarova’s opinion is inconsistent with her own treatment of Grogan.  
Although Stolyarova diagnosed Grogan with major depression, PTSD, and bipolar 
disorder, Stolyarova’s yearly evaluations consistently rated Grogan’s symptoms as mild 
to moderate, reflected in her GAF scores of 60 and higher.  Stolyarova’s records also 
indicate that Grogan typically showed intact thought processes and cooperative behavior, 
was goal-directed, and maintained appropriate grooming and appearance.   
 Stolyarova’s opinion is also inconsistent with Dr. Karzova’s treatment records, 
which showed significant improvement in Grogan’s mental condition.  Indeed, in 2009, 
Karzova assigned Grogan a GAF score of 65, indicating more mild symptoms and 
representing the highest score assigned to Grogan during the period at issue.  
Additionally, Grogan reported to Karzova that she felt a “60% improvement” with 
medication, (App. 2 at 432,) and Karzova observed a “slight improvement” in Grogan’s 
condition, (Tr. at 448).  Therefore, Karzova’s treatment of Grogan reasonably 
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demonstrates a relatively mild and improving condition, inconsistent with Stolyarova’s 
restrictive assessment. 
 Stolyarova’s opinion is also contradicted by the opinion of the state agency 
psychologist, Dr. Taren.10
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the 
ALJ’s decision.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
  Taren concluded that Grogan had no significant limitations 
other than moderate limitations in her ability to understand, remember, and carry out 
detailed instructions, to maintain concentration, persistence, or pace, and to respond 
appropriately to changes in work setting.   
 Based on the evidence indicating that Stolyarova’s restrictive opinion was 
inconsistent with her own treatment records and with the opinions of other mental health 
professionals, there was an adequate basis for the ALJ to decide to give diminished 
weight to Stolyarova’s opinion. 
III. Conclusion 
 
                                              
10 As the District Court recognized, Taren’s report was made prior to Grogan’s 
attempted suicide and involuntary hospital stay.  That is significant; however, it should be 
noted that the ALJ gave Taren’s opinion “some weight but not substantive weight” and 
gave Grogan “the benefit of the doubt” by giving her a “slightly more restrictive residual 
functional capacity.”  (App. 2 at 21.) 
